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After Grutter v. Bollinger Higher Education Must Keep 
Its Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy 
 
L. Darnell Weeden*
 
In Grutter v. Bollinger,1 the United States Supreme Court was asked 
to decide whether utilizing race as a factor in law student admissions by 
the University of Michigan Law School (“Law School”) to advance 
diversity is a constitutionally permissible compelling state interest under 
its Bakke opinion.2 The highly regarded and prestigious Law School 
made a commitment to achieve a diverse student body by considering 
race among other factors in the admission process. The Law School 
articulated a goal of admitting students from a variety of backgrounds 
and experiences in order to promote an exchange of ideas and mutual 
intellectual respect. The Law School’s diversity program highlighted an 
applicant’s academic ability coupled with a flexible evaluation of the 
applicant’s ability to expand the learning environment of other 
individuals in the law school community and legal profession.3
Unfortunately, the day has not come when America has reached a 
point of cultural and racial maturity in the context of higher education to 
abandon the governmental use of race-based laws to benefit or burden an 
individual. The Grutter opinion was a wake-up call for Americans that 
the day to end race discrimination in higher education has not yet come. 
After reading the Supreme Court’s critical statement, “We expect that 25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary 
to further the [diversity] interest approved today,”4 it should be 
concluded that diversity based on racial discrimination should end now 
and not after twenty-five years of racially flawed codependence. Because 
* Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law; Texas Southern University: B.A., J.D., University of 
Mississippi. The author would like to thank Attorney Ahunanya Anga, Registrar, Thurgood Marshall 
School of Law for her valuable comments concerning earlier drafts of this article, and Trung Chi 
Tran and Simeon Coker, both Research Assistants at Thurgood Marshall School of Law Class of 
2005 for their research help. The author would additionally like to thank the organizers of the 2003 
Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference for allowing him to present some of his 
ideas contained in this article as a work. This opportunity to present to a community of legal scholars 
has provided the author with intellectual insight and consideration even though many participants at 
the conference strongly disagreed with the author’s theory on some of the issues presented. 
 1. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
 2. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 3. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325. 
 4. Id. at 2347. 
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race-based diversity policy promotes notions of racial superiority and 
racial inferiority, a race-based diversity program is inherently flawed. 
Part I of this article portrays the implication of race-based slavery for 
the current race-based diversity debate in higher education. Part II of this 
article describes the racially perceptive setting and procedural history of 
the issues presented in Grutter and puts forward the reasoning of the 
majority opinion. Part III raises the question of whether Grutter’s 
treatment of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke as binding precedent for 
diversity that discriminates on the basis of race is intellectual conjecture 
not supported by prior decisions of the Court. Part IV addresses whether 
the Supreme Court’s heightened judicial scrutiny applies to disfavored 
whites as individuals. Part V discusses whether the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Grutter has a negative impact on African-Americans because 
the opinion may have sent a message that racial diversity equals 
accommodating racial inferiority. Part VI analyzes the implication of 
race-neutral college legacy preferences for family members in the 
context of affirmative action. Part VII contends that the whites-only 
scholarship is an unfortunate foreseeable consequence of race exclusive 
scholarships for other racial groups. Part VIII notes the elusive search for 
an equitable public policy that narrows the education achievement gaps 
between historically disadvantaged students and middle class non-
minority students. 
 
I.  THE IMPLICATION OF RACE-BASED SLAVERY FOR THE CURRENT 
RACE-BASED DIVERSITY DEBATE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
Although diversity in higher education is important, the use of race-
conscious discriminatory laws in the United States should not be utilized 
because neither the local, state, or federal government is sensitive enough 
to the goals of diversity to fairly use the race card. The real intellectual 
diversity issue is whether historical race-based slavery and sequential 
racial discrimination for more than 130 years have a continuing impact 
on higher education opportunities for African-Americans. In a recent 
interview, Professor Ronald Ferguson of Harvard, and an African-
American parent, stated that the racial gap in academic achievement 
between blacks and whites in affluent upper middle class integrated 
suburbs exists because of economics, and “the human damage from two 
centuries of slavery plus legalized segregation that persisted until the 
mid-1960’s will simply not be undone in a generation, not even in 
suburbia.”5
 5. Michael Winerip, In the Affluent Suburbs, an Invisible Race Gap, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/04/education/04EDUC.html?ex=1370145600& 
  
161] TAINTED DIVERSITY PRIZE 163 
 
Race-based diversity preferences in higher education are not 
adequate compensation for historical race-based slavery, and laws that 
discriminated against African-Americans because of their race and race-
based preferences are too politically and racially sensitive to be assigned 
to government officials or the American public. All Americans 
committed to diversity in higher education must thoughtfully monitor the 
diversity blueprint to determine whether educational diversity is best 
achieved through a race-conscious admission method or by using an 
approach that is free of racial discrimination. The Supreme Court in 
Grutter6 has delayed the day when American leaders must apologize to 
African-Americans for America’s race-based pro-slavery history7 and 
current social policies of racial stereotyping and instead embark on a 
diversity policy without racial discrimination designed to serve the best 
interest of the descendents of its former African-American slaves. Less 
than three weeks after the decision in Grutter, during a tour of Africa, 
President George W. Bush may have taken an unintended small step 
toward an official apology for slavery by condemning the American 
slave trade as “one of the greatest crimes in history.”8
 President Bush’s recongition of black Americans’ contiuning raw 
wound from the continuing vestiges of slavery is rare among white 
Americans.9 By reciting the particulars of America’s shameful history of 
en=e75e089899966773&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND. Winerip reports: 
[Ferguson’s] research shows that in the years before school, white parents spend more 
time reading to their children, while blacks devote more to song and play – the start of the 
gap. Professor Ferguson writes, “As a black parent, I acknowledge there might be 
differences in what we do with our preschool children that would put them on a more 
equal footing with whites on the first day of kindergarten.” 
Id. 
 6. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325. 
 7. See id. at 2347 (Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., concurring). “[I]t was only 25 years before Bakke 
that this Court declared public school segregation unconstitutional, a declaration that, after 
prolonged resistance, yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of 
centuries of slavery.” Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
 8. Tamara Lipper, Alternative Motive, Maybe?, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 2003, available at 
2003 WL 8639475. Lipper reports: 
On his whirlwind tour of Africa last week, President George W. Bush pledged $15 billion 
to fight AIDS, denounced the American slave trade as “one of the greatest crimes in 
history,” toured a wildlife park, met with African leaders and publicly weighed sending 
troops to help suffering Liberians. In the words of one GOP official, the trip was intended 
to “catch people’s attention,” reminding them that the war in Iraq hasn’t diminished 
Bush’s desire to be seen as a compassionate conservative. With next year’s elections 
approaching, Bush aides were especially eager to use the trip to improve his standing 
with African-American voters, who have a “perception problem with the Republican 
Party,” says one official. (Two still sore points: the Trent Lott debacle and the president’s 
own stand against affirmative action). 
Id. 
 9. Id. 
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slavery, President Bush made the story of America’s African 
slaves more widely known.10 “Between 1 million and 2 million captives 
were shipped out to the New World from the Senegambian region, of 
which Goree’s door of no return was the main point of embarkation. 
Conservative estimates put the total numbers exiled from their African 
homeland between 10 million and 12 million.”11 A race sensitive 
diversity essay question for all applicants to America’s elite colleges may 
ask all potential students to discuss whether the American slavery issue 
has impacted their personal view on diversity in higher education. 
President Bush’s speech on slavery during the summer of 2003 at 
Goree Island in Senegal probably surprised a number of Americans.12 
College applicants may also be challenged to explore whether 
historical racial slavery has a continuing economic13 impact on one’s 
ability to receive an effective education in America today.14 “To 
understand racism and its deep-seated roots in American society, one 
must have a knowledge and understanding of history.”15
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (“Before the massive European immigration of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
more Africans than Europeans entered the Americas. By the time the American Civil War broke out 
in 1861, the largest enslaved population in the world lived in the United States.”) 
 12. Neil Irvin Parker, Bush at Goree: Words don’t Heal Slavery’s Wound, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, July 13, 2003, Outlook Section 1, available at 2003 WL 57427708.
 13. Id. Mr. Parker explains that: 
Bush mentioned the trauma of transportation and sale. He listed the main economic 
handicaps related to enslavement: Unpaid labor, restrictions on marriage and, therefore, 
on inheritance, no property, no accumulation of wealth, and virtually no education meant 
black people were penniless at emancipation. 
  When blacks became U.S. citizens in the 1860s, they started at economic ground 
zero. For three or four subsequent generations, racial discrimination and exclusion from 
public life kept black people the poorest people in the nation. The era of legal segregation 
ended . . . but the enduring lack of wealth keeps black people the poorest in the nation. 
Id. 
 14. Id. Mr. Parker states that: 
Perhaps the power of that chilling place awakened Bush to the viciousness of the 
institution that created the American political economy. Most of the founding fathers 
were slave owners, including Benjamin Franklin. And the power of slavery shaped the 
compromises of the constitutional convention, the United States Constitution and the first 
half of the 19th century. Slavery, as Bush noted, was no little thing. 
  Echoing slave owner Thomas Jefferson, Bush tallied up the usually forgotten costs 
of slavery to the owners: “Years of unpunished brutality and bullying and rape produced 
a dullness and hardness of conscience. Christian men and women became blind to the 
clearest commands of their faith and added hypocrisy to injustice.” 
Id. 
 15. Jeffrey J. Wallace, Ideology vs. Reality: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in a Color Blind 
Society, 36 AKRON L. REV. 693, 697 (2003). Wallace states: 
George Santanya [sic] once wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned 
to repeat it.” An understanding of the past is critical in interpreting the present, with the 
hope of resolving problems in the future. There is a legacy in America of anti-Black 
sentiment, White superiority, and Black inferiority. There is a stigma of racism and a 
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Each applicant should be given an opportunity to discuss diverse 
perspectives on the issue of the relationship of slavery to diversity in 
higher education in order to promote the intellectual dexterity 
appropriate for attendance at one of America’s elite colleges or 
universities. To truly promote the intellectual diversity and historical 
perspective, all applicants seeking admissions to a school with a race-
based diversity admission plan might consider whether they agree with 
one commentator’s view that the Declaration of Independence refused to 
condemn African-American slavery because the leaders of the American 
Revolution supported America’s anti-black attitude.16 “This anti-Black 
sentiment, based on historical memory, stereotypes, and blatant racism 
continues to plague our society and prevents us from honestly and openly 
dealing with race in America today.”17 If Grutter18 is truly about 
engaging in a robust exchange of ideas, it is appropriate that elite 
colleges engage in a robust debate about whether it is fair to characterize 
America as having either an anti-black or pro-white way of thinking 
about racial diversity in higher education. Diversity based on racial 
discrimination negatively impacts America’s effort to become a society 
free of racial discrimination. 
Justice O’Connor, the author of the Grutter opinion, was appointed 
to the Supreme Court “through affirmative action.”19 According to some 
commentators, Justice O’Connor returned the affirmative action favor in 
Grutter by taking a leadership role “in the most important affirmative-
action case in decades.”20 Justice O’Connor’s vote to support the Law 
School’s race-based diversity plan is generally regarded as the decisive 
tiebreaker.21 It is generally believed that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the Law School “affirmative-action case was squarely in line with the 
opinions of most editorial writers and business and academic leaders.”22 
failure to learn from the past, which prevents the achievement of true equality. If we as a 
nation are going to live up to our values of freedom, equality, and social justice, then we 
must open our minds and our hearts to accept the truth of our convictions and be true to 
our values and ideals. 
Id. 
 16. Id. at 697-98. 
 17. Id. at 699. 
 18. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
 19. Evan Thomas, Stuart Taylor Jr., Debra Rosenberg & Eleanor Clift, Center Court; She 
Helped America Seek a Middle Ground on the Thorny Subject of Race. Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
Brand of Justice, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8639381. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. Newsweek reported that: 
Corporations and universities flooded the court with briefs arguing that affirmative action 
has been a success at providing diversity on campus and in the workplace. Nonetheless, 
O’Connor’s reasoning was a little slippery or muddy, as several columnists, like Slate’s 
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However, before the proverbial ink was dry on the landmark Grutter 
decision, both opponents and supporters of racial preferences in higher 
education were preparing for the next battle over race-based affirmative 
action in higher education.23
During July 2003, approximately fifty college presidents met at 
Harvard to honor the Supreme Court’s decision supporting race-based 
diversity in higher education.24 However, the celebration honoring the 
Grutter decision was guarded as officials analyzed how to address the 
next wave of litigation and constitutional referendums.25 In the same 
month, Ward Connerly, an African-American, started a ballot initiative 
in Michigan to make racial preferences in admissions illegal under state 
law.26 Connerly used the ballot initiative approach in California and 
Washington to outlaw race-based admissions in higher education.27 
Because diversity without racial discrimination in higher education is an 
idea whose time has come, this article will attempt to give thoughtful 
consideration to the issue of race-based affirmative action versus 
affirmative action free of racial discrimination in higher education in a 
post-Grutter world. 
 
II.  THE RACIALLY PERCEPTIVE SETTING AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF 
GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER 
 
The Michigan Law School diversity policy mandated admissions 
representatives to review each applicant’s file. The individual assessment 
of the applicant’s file included consideration of a personal statement, 
letters of recommendation, and an essay that addressed how the applicant 
would add to the existing diversity at the Law School.28 In appraising an 
Michael Kinsley, pointed out. (An angry Clarence Thomas, the court’s black 
conservative, castigated O’Connor for following the “faddish slogans” of the 
“cognoscenti.”) 
Id. 
 23. Pat Wingert & Debra Rosenberg, Just the Beginning, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 8639524. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. Wingert and Rosenberg reported that: 
The Center for Equal Opportunity has filed three complaints with the Department of 
Education’s Office of Civil Rights, arguing that programs designed to boost minority 
enrollment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, St. Louis University and 
Virginia Tech violate the law. At the same time, it has written letters to some 30 other 
schools, threatening to file more complaints if the schools don’t make changes in “race 
exclusive” scholarship and out-reach programs—a strategy that could serve as a model 
for future attacks. 
Id. 
 28. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332. 
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applicant’s file, admissions representatives looked at the applicant’s 
undergraduate grade point average (“GPA”) and Law School Admissions 
Test (“LSAT”) score because they serve as significant forecasters of 
academic success in law school.29 The Law School’s race-conscious 
diversity plan emphasized that “no applicant should be admitted unless 
we expect that applicant to do well enough to graduate with no serious 
academic problems.”30 The flexible diversity admission plan declared 
that having the highest possible score would not guarantee admission to 
the Law School. On the other hand, a low score did not automatically 
disqualify an applicant under the diversity plan because the soft, 
intangible, less-than-objective variables may foretell that an applicant is 
a strong candidate to “contribut[e] to the intellectual and social life of the 
institution.”31
To its credit, the Law School’s diversity plan is based on the broad 
concept of educational enrichment. To achieve this goal, the Law School 
does not limit the diversity contribution entitled to substantial weight in 
its admission procedure to racial and ethnic status alone as the plan 
includes other factors for diversity admissions.32 The Law School asserts 
in unequivocal terms its dedication to racial and ethnic diversity with 
particular attention given to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic, 
and Native American students because of their long history of being 
victims of racial and ethnic discrimination.33 The Law School believes 
that without a race-conscious component in its diversity plan African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans would not be present in its 
student body in meaningful numbers.34
In 1996, Barbara Grutter, a white female citizen of Michigan with a 
3.8 grade point average and an LSAT score of 161 was denied admission 
to the Law School.35 In December 1997, Grutter filed a reverse 
discrimination lawsuit in federal district court against the Law School 
and other University of Michigan officials alleging that the Law School 
intentionally discriminated against her because she was a member of the 
white race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
against racial discrimination. Grutter also contended in the lawsuit that 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196436 and 42 U.S.C. § 198137 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2004) provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
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prohibit the Law School’s race-conscious factors.38 Grutter asserted that 
she was denied admission because the Law School’s use of race as a 
predominant factor benefited specific preferred racial minority group 
candidates at the expense of white candidates with similar credentials of 
those candidates from minority racial groups.39
The district court conducted a bench trial concerning the degree to 
which race was a factor in the Law School’s admission process.40 The 
district court also analyzed whether the Law School’s use of race in its 
admission process constituted an illegal race-based double standard.41 
Throughout the fifteen-day bench trial the litigants presented a wide 
range of evidence regarding how the Law School made use of race in its 
admissions process.42 In an effort to measure the degree to which the 
Law School actually used race in the admission process, Grutter’s expert 
Dr. Kinley Larntz evaluated the Law School’s “admissions grids” for 
1995-2000.43 Dr. Larntz concluded that race was not the predominant 
factor in the Law School’s admissions process.44 Following Dr. Larntz’s 
concession, it was constitutionally plausible for the court in following the 
Supreme Court’s rationale used in the majority-minority congressional 
district cases to conclude that race may be used as a factor in 
governmental decision making in certain limited circumstances where 
race is not the predominant motivating factor.45
Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the Law School’s expert, stated during the 
trial that removing race as a motivating factor in the Law School’s 
admission process would have an extremely harmful impact on diversity 
admissions.46 According to Dr. Raudenbush, a race-neutral admissions 
process would have reduced the number of race-based diversity 
applicants admitted from thirty-five percent to ten percent in 2000.47 Dr. 
Raudenbush testified that under a race-neutral plan, the underrepresented 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2004) states: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every 
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and 
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
 38. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332. 
 39. Id. at 2332-33. 
 40. Id. at 2333. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 2334. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
 46. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2334. 
 47. Id. 
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minority students would have constituted only four percent of the 
entering class in 2000 as opposed to the 14.5 percent who were actually 
admitted.48 At the conclusion of the trial, the federal district court held 
that the Law School’s utilization of race as a factor in its admission 
process was illegal under the strict scrutiny standard.49 The district court 
ruled that the Law School’s interest in creating and maintaining student 
diversity was not compelling because racial diversity was not a 
compelling interest under the rationale of Bakke.50 The district court also 
stated that even if racial diversity in higher education were a compelling 
interest, the Law School’s use of race as a factor to advance that interest 
was not constitutionally permissible because it was not narrowly 
tailored.51 The district court agreed to Grutter’s demand for declaratory 
relief and prohibited the Law School from considering race as a factor in 
its admission process.52
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the injunction pending an 
appeal.53 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, set aside 
the injunction, and held that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke created 
racial diversity as a valid compelling state interest.54 The court also ruled 
that the Law School’s treatment of race was narrowly tailored for the 
reason that race was simply a “potential ‘plus’ factor” and because the 
Law School’s diversity admission process was “virtually identical” to the 
Harvard diversity admission process portrayed favorably by Justice 
Powell.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari56 to decide the disputed 
issue of whether diversity is a compelling enough interest to justify a 
narrowly tailored treatment of race in selecting applicants for admission 
to public universities.57
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 2335. 
 50. Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
 51. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335. 
 57. Id. (“Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (Hopwood I) (holding that 
diversity is not a compelling state interest), with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 
(9th Cir.2000) (holding that it is).”). 
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III.  WHETHER GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER’S TREATMENT OF JUSTICE 
POWELL’S OPINION IN BAKKE AS BINDING PRECEDENT FOR DIVERSITY 
THAT DISCRIMINATES ON THE BASIS OF RACE IS INTELLECTUAL 
CONJECTURE NOT SUPPORTED BY PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE COURT 
 
According to Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court previously 
attended to the issue of race-conscious admissions in public higher 
education twenty-five years earlier in the landmark Bakke decision.58 
Bakke involved a racial set-aside admissions program that allotted 
sixteen out of one hundred places in a medical school class for 
individuals from specified minority groups.59 Justice Powell supported 
the state court’s ruling invalidating the set-aside program, but he did not 
affirm the state court’s injunction prohibiting the use of race in the 
admission process.60 The Supreme Court in Bakke held that a “State has a 
substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised 
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and 
ethnic origin.”61 In Bakke, the Court overruled the component of the state 
court’s judgment that forbade the university from using race as a factor 
for any applicant.62 Because Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke 
announced the fractured ruling of the Court, his opinion has served as the 
benchmark for constitutional analysis of permissible race-conscious 
admissions policies.63
The Court in Grutter v. Bollinger discussed the Powell opinion in 
detail and treated his opinion in Bakke as if it were the opinion of the 
Court, not because of any binding legal precedent, but because elite 
colleges had relied on Justice Powell’s opinion in adopting their diversity 
policies.64 The Supreme Court acknowledged in a classic understatement 
that its fractured decision in Bakke created a circumstance where the 
lower courts made a great effort to determine whether Justice Powell’s 
racial diversity rationale articulated in Bakke, without support from any 
other Justice, was binding precedent under the holding in Marks.65 In 
Marks, the Supreme Court stated “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2335-36. 
 61. Id. at 2336 (citation omitted). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2337 (citations omitted). 
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grounds.”66
The Supreme Court avoided its responsibility to decide in Grutter 
whether Justice Powell met the Marks test because the test is hard to 
apply to the issue of racial diversity in higher education.67 The Court’s 
refusal to decide whether Justice Powell’s racial diversity rationale is 
binding Supreme Court precedent under Marks creates the impression 
that the Court was predisposed to reach a specific result on race-based 
diversity in higher education without giving adequate consideration to 
the natural and logical legal consequence of applying Marks to the issues 
presented in Grutter. The Supreme Court’s treatment of the Marks test in 
Grutter left unresolved the question about the value of the test as legal 
precedent in future cases involving race-based diversity.68  
Although Marks may be binding precedent in other areas of the law, 
the Court’s decision in Grutter has implicitly created an exception to the 
Marks fractured opinion rationale in cases involving an issue of racial 
diversity in higher education. The Court in Grutter could have limited 
the Marks splintered opinion narrowest ground rationale to those cases, 
like Marks, where all the federal appellate courts are in agreement that a 
plurality opinion represents the holding of the United States Supreme 
Court without extending the Marks inquiry to a logical extreme.69 
Although the Supreme Court refused to decide whether Justice Powell’s 
opinion supporting racial diversity as a compelling interest in higher 
education is binding under Marks, one commentator concluded that the 
Ninth Circuit got it right and that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke is 
binding precedent under Marks.70
 66. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). “Three Justices agreed with the 
prevailing opinion in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, consented on 
more extensive grounds in reversing the judgment below.” Id. at 193. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. 
Justice Douglas repeated their well-known view that the First Amendment grants an absolute shield 
against governmental action designed to restrain obscenity. Mr. Justice Stewart also acquiesced in 
the judgment because he believed that only “hardcore pornography” may be censored. In Marks, the 
Supreme Court apparently concluded that the opinion of the Memoirs plurality represented the 
holding of the Court and supplied the governing standards because every Court of Appeals that has 
adjudicated the question between Memoirs and Miller properly concluded that Memoirs was 
controlling precedent. Under the Memoirs standard, provocative words and pictures were deemed to 
be constitutionally protected unless the prosecution demonstrated that they were “utterly without 
redeeming social value.” Id. at 193-94. 
 67. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337 (citations omitted). 
 68. Id. (citation omitted). 
 69. Marks, 430 U.S. at 194. 
 70. Joelle A. Marty, Comment, Affirmative Action In Higher Education: Federal Circuit 
Court Split Over Bakke’s Diversity Rationale, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 505, 528 (2003). Marty states: 
Applying Marks v. United States, Justice Powell’s decision is binding precedent because 
it represents the narrowest grounds upon which Bakke could rest. That is, Justice 
Powell’s ‘plus factor’ approach rests on more narrow grounds than a broad race-based 
possibility. Therefore, under Supreme Court precedent, Justice Powell’s opinion controls, 
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IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY APPLIES 
TO DISFAVORED WHITES AS INDIVIDUALS 
 
In the context of racial diversity and higher education, the Supreme 
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger71 by necessary implication extended its 
heightened judicial scrutiny rationale of footnote four in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.72 to disfavored white individuals that are not 
members of an insular and discrete minority.73 According to Professors 
Farber and Frickey, under the traditional understanding of Justice Stone’s 
well-known footnote four, strict judicial scrutiny was needed to protect 
insular and discrete racial minorities because of their lack of voice in the 
political process.74 While it is unpersuasive that Carolene Products did 
not properly conclude in footnote four that racial minorities were in need 
of judicial intervention to protect them from a racially hostile political 
process,75 footnote four of Carolene Products is best understood as 
protecting every individual from racial discrimination by the state in the 
irrespective of the Brennan Group’s failure to join the portion of Justice Powell’s opinion 
that discussed diversity. 
Id. (citing Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 71. 123 S. Ct. at 2333. 
 72. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). (“[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”) 
 73. Id. 
 74. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on 
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 686 (1991) 
(citations omitted). 
 75. Id. at 687. Farber and Frickey also state: 
Third, by focusing on political powerlessness, the conventional rationale can lead to more 
“searching judicial inquiry” whenever positive political theory suggests that some group 
is systematically disadvantaged in the political process. The theory has thus been subject 
to Justice Scalia’s ironic invocation of it, not as a shield protecting racial minorities 
against discrimination, but as a sword against affirmative action measures. If Justice 
Scalia is right, Carolene Products is defunct as a justification for protecting racial 
minorities, whom he characterizes as organized groups that politicians are eager to 
please. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s argument flips Carolene Products completely: it is the 
members of the majority who are politically powerless and in need of judicial protection. 
  Justice Scalia’s argument finds apparent support in an influential article by a highly 
unlikely ideological bedfellow, Bruce Ackerman. Drawing on the writings of public 
choice theorists, Ackerman argued that Carolene Products was wrong in suggesting that 
discrete minorities need special protection from the political process; instead, it is diffuse, 
large groups whose interests are likely to be underrepresented. Ackerman did not seem to 
have had affirmative action in mind, but his theory fits Justice Scalia’s assertions well, 
and Ackerman’s critique may have the unintended results of justifying a more relaxed 
judicial approach to discrimination against racial minorities and supporting Justice 
Scalia’s stance toward affirmative action. 
Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted). 
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absence of a compelling justification.76 As a result of not restricting 
suspect racial classifications to insular and discrete minorities, the 
Supreme Court has granted people of all races strict scrutiny equal 
protection.77
The Supreme Court’s holding in Grutter78 rejected the argument that 
under Carolene Products’79 more exacting judicial scrutiny standards, 
the State of Michigan did not have to demonstrate a “compelling interest 
to justify [its] use of race in the admissions process.”80 In Grutter, the 
Supreme Court stated, “[t]oday we endorse Justice Powell’s view that 
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the 
use of race in university admissions.”81 In 1991, Professors Farber and 
Frickey predicted that the future of race-based affirmative action or racial 
diversity could be decided by the role eventually assigned to the 
Carolene Products suspected category rationale.82 Professors Farber and 
Frickey believed Carolene Products promised groups traditionally 
“excluded from full membership in the political community will receive 
an inviting reception from the judiciary” to protect their interest.83 One of 
the most fascinating aspects of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter 
resides in her bold declaration that the rationale for racial diversity in 
higher education is to promote higher education’s interest in a robust 
exchange of intellectual ideas, and not to correct any historical 
educational or social deficits of traditionally excluded insular and 
discrete minorities.84
 76. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 211-23 (1995). 
 77. See id.; see also L. Darnell Weeden, How to Establish Flying the Confederate Flag with 
the State as Sponsor Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 34 AKRON L. REV. 521 (2001). 
 78. 123 S. Ct. at 2337. 
 79. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 80. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2333. 
 81. Id. at 2337. 
 82. Farber & Frickey, supra note 74, at 718. 
 83. Id. at 726. 
 84. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336. Justice O’Connor states: 
In Justice Powell’s view, when governmental decisions “touch upon an individual’s race 
or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked 
to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” 
Id., at 299, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Under this exacting standard, only one of the interests asserted 
by the university survived Justice Powell’s scrutiny. 
  First, Justice Powell rejected an interest in “‘reducing the historic deficit of 
traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession’” as 
an unlawful interest in racial balancing. Id., at 306-307, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Second, Justice 
Powell rejected an interest in remedying societal discrimination because such measures 
would risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties “who bear no 
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are 
thought to have suffered.” Id., at 310, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Third, Justice Powell rejected an 
interest in “increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities 
currently underserved,” concluding that even if such an interest could be compelling in 
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Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter85 that Justice Powell’s 
support for racial diversity in higher education twenty-five years ago in 
Bakke86 was intended to serve the interest of the predominantly white 
university’s interest in intellectual diversity is consistent with Professor 
Derrick Bell’s87 assertion that racial equality for African-Americans, 
whether it is called diversity or affirmative action, will only be attained 
when racial equality serves an overriding interest of whites. Under 
Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory88 African-Americans 
interest in achieving racial diversity has no independent value separate 
from the interest of white elites.89
In a recent critique of the Supreme Court’s Grutter opinion, 
Professor Bell maintains that the Grutter opinion is a “definitive 
example” of his “I-C interest convergence theory.”90 Professor Bell 
asserts his rationale for arguing that Grutter is a prime example of his 
interest convergence theory is based on Justice O’Connor’s historical and 
rather rigid opposition to race-based affirmative action in the economic 
some circumstances the program under review was not “geared to promote that goal.” Id., 
at 306, 310, 98 S. Ct. 2733. 
  Justice Powell approved the university’s use of race to further only one interest: 
“the attainment of a diverse student body.” Id., at 311, 98 S. Ct. 2733. With the important 
proviso that “constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be 
disregarded,” Justice Powell grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that “long 
has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.” Id., at 312, 314, 98 S. Ct. 
2733. 
Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 87. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980). Professor Bell states: 
What accounted, then, for the sudden shift in 1954 away from the separate but equal 
doctrine and towards a commitment to desegregation? 
  . . . [T]he decision in Brown to break with the Court’s long-held position on these 
issues cannot be understood without some consideration of the decision’s value to whites, 
not simply those concerned about the immorality of racial inequality, but also those 
whites in policymaking positions able to see the economic and political advances at home 
and abroad that would follow abandonment of segregation . . . . [T]he decision helped to 
provide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the 
hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples. 
Id. 
 88. Id. at 523. Professor Bell explains that: 
Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown, this 
principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interest of blacks in achieving racial 
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites. 
However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy 
providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the 
superior societal status of middle and upper class whites. 
Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003). 
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arena of government contracts and public sector employment.91 Justice 
O’Connor, according to Professor Bell, has generally disapproved of 
race-based affirmative action when she believes the interests of whites 
will be harmed in the areas of employment and government contracts.92 
Professor Bell believes that Justice O’Connor only supported race-based 
diversity in legal education because O’Connor apparently believes that 
race-based diversity is a benefit and not a burden to whites.93 It is 
Professor Bell’s opinion that under the Court’s holding in Grutter, blacks 
and Hispanics are the fortuitous beneficiaries of a Court opinion 
designed to benefit members of the nonminority elite.94 “When she 
perceived in the Michigan Law School’s admission program an 
affirmative action plan that minimizes the importance of race while 
offering maximum protection to whites and those aspects of society with 
which she identifies, she supported it.”95 Professor Bell believes that 
Justice O’Connor supported diversity in Grutter because diversity is an 
expedient means for admitting predominantly white children of wealth 
and privilege while admitting a critical mass of selected minorities.96 If 
white children of privilege and wealth admitted to elite schools are 
generally required to have higher grades and LSAT scores than African-
Americans and Hispanics, the Court in Grutter has reinvented a new age 
de facto separate but unequal doctrine in a poorly camouflaged effort to 
hide what Professor Bell97 correctly describes as an elite class-based bias 
in favor of the children of wealth and privilege. 
Some commentators conclude that Grutter will have little impact on 
the average African-American because only a small number of African-
Americans apply to selective colleges like the University of Michigan.98 
It is suggested by some that Grutter was “concerned with creating more 
black leaders by opening places for them in elite schools.”99 One may ask 
what interest of the white upper class and middle classes could be served 
by assuring that a critical mass of black leaders attends elite schools. One 
plausible answer may be that many racial minorities who attend elite 
schools tend to share the race-based elite focus of promoting racial 
diversity as a symbol of racial progress without providing any 
meaningful solutions to the persistent problem of economic and social 
 91. Id. at 1625-26. 
 92. Id. at 1626. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1625. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1632. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Thomas, Taylor, Rosenberg & Clift, supra note 19. 
 99. Id. 
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disparity between African-Americans and whites.100 What makes the 
huge investment of ingenuity and resources in the defense of Michigan’s 
racial preferences disappointing is that the investment is grotesquely 
disproportionate to any good it will do the African-American 
community. But by the logic of the diversity rationale for preferences, 
doing good for African-Americans is an afterthought.101
The cruel constitutional incongruity of the Grutter rationale is that 
the decision is intended to impose a racially discriminatory hardship on 
specific white individuals without really benefiting rank-and-file 
African-Americans as a group, while unnecessarily prolonging future 
litigation about race-based affirmative action in college admissions.102 
 100. George F. Will, Race-norming in Michigan; At Issue is the Racial Goal of Overthrowing 
a Core Principle of Our Open Society – that Rights Inhere in Individuals, not Groups, NEWSWEEK, 
June 23, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8639237. Will states: 
Michigan’s supposed solicitude for minorities is an aspect of a national scandal. 
Nationwide, 45 percent of African-American young people have their life chances 
irrevocably blighted by never receiving high-school diplomas. In 2000 only 2 percent of 
Michigan’s African-American eighth graders registered as “proficient” on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress math test. Five percent is the national average for 
African-American eighth graders. For whites, the average is 34 percent proficient. 
  Yet what are the nation’s educational and opinion-forming elites obsessing about? 
The defense of Michigan’s racial preferences. 
  Racial preferences for diversity pur-poses [sic] matter only at selective colleges, the 
minority of four-year institutions that do not have, essentially, open admissions – open to 
any high-school graduate and, in many cases, nongraduates. Such preferences matter 
greatly only at highly selective institutions – those that receive at least twice as many 
applications as they accept. There are fewer than 100 such institutions. 
  . . . The real purpose of socially engineered diversity is to somehow – there is scant 
evidence as to just how this supposedly works – improve the educational experience for 
all students attending elite institutions. Which means diversity preferences are intended 
primarily for the benefit of nonminorities. 
  The preferred minorities – mainly African-Americans but also Hispanics – are 
being used as seasoning ingredients for elite institutions. These institutions do not dwell 
on certain amply documented and discomforting facts. As Taylor notes, the preferred 
minorities have high failure and dropout rates and cluster disproportionately in the 
bottom quarter of their classes. And of those who try to use their degrees from elite 
institutions as passports to elite professional schools, most again are admitted on the basis 
of schools’ racial double standards, and “shockingly high percentages” of preferentially 
admitted students “end up flunking their medical boards and bar exams.” 
Id.; see also, Michelle A. Whitham, Defining the Job: Understanding Job Descriptions, 1 DRAFTING 
EMPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS HANDBOOK SUPPLEMENT § 7.5 (Massachusetts 
Continuing Legal Education, Inc., 2002). Race norming, or “within-group scoring,” is the practice of 
adjusting employment test scores so that a minority test taker’s score is compared to other test takers 
of the same race, not to the general population of all test takers. Race norming is the only type of 
conduct the 1991 Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits. This prohibition reflects the growing 
national debate over affirmative action in general, and racial preferences and reverse discrimination 
in particular. Id. 
 101. Will, supra note 100. 
 102. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (with whom 
Thomas, J. joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part). “Unlike a clear constitutional holding 
that racial preferences in state educational institutions are impermissible, or even a clear anti-
constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are OK, today’s 
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Justice Scalia does an excellent job in identifying some of the 
constitutional issues that will be litigated in the future because of the 
inherently flawed Supreme Court race-based constitutional analysis used 
in Grutter to justify reverse race-based discrimination.103 Justice Scalia 
states that the Grutter future litigation roadmap will, at a minimum, 
include the following six issues:104 (1) whether the race-based diversity 
discrimination actually evaluates the individual predominately on the 
merits or is the individual being evaluated under the separate but unequal 
admission track for racial minority students who fall below the normal 
admission criteria required of whites as a group;105 (2) whether the race-
based discriminatory diversity purpose of obtaining a critical mass of 
minority race students is a in fact an unconstitutional quota system 
because race is actually the predominant factor in identifying the critical 
mass of benefited racial minorities;106 (3) whether the race-based 
diversity discrimination is a cause in fact of any traditional educational 
benefits;107 (4) whether a university or college is truly committed to the 
race-based discriminatory diversity approved by the Court in Grutter 
(Justice Scalia has appropriately concluded that a university 
accommodating reverse self imposed racial segregation by minority race 
students with their “minority-only” activities as not being true to the 
principle of multiculturalism and racial diversity);108 (5) whether the 
college’s discriminatory racial diversity preference is in compliance with 
the mystical critical minority racial mass concept identified in Grutter;109 
and (6) whether a college’s race-based diversity discrimination will make 
it liable to minority groups that are “intentionally short changed in the 
institution’s composition of its generic minority ‘critical mass.’”110
No one should be surprised that the opinion in Grutter will generate 
a great deal of future litigation because there are Americans who have 
the belief that the government should never discriminate on the basis of 
Grutter-Gratz split double header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the 
litigation.” Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 2349-50. 
 105. Id. at 2349. 
 106. Id. 
 107. It is important to note that the educational benefits issue was not contested in Grutter. 
 108. Id. at 2349-50. Scalia states: 
Tempting targets, one would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk of 
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of tribalism and 
racial segregation on their campuses—through minority-only student organizations, 
separate minority housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, even separate 
minority-only graduation ceremonies. 
Id. 
 109. Id. at 2350. 
 110. Id. 
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race.111 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s conclusion that “[t]he 
Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, 
and state-provided education is no exception,”112 is also incorrect 
because the Supreme Court has consistently allowed the government to 
discriminate on the basis of race for compelling reasons.113 However, if 
the Court were to treat race as the forbidden governmental 
classification114 the government would be prohibited from ever treating 
any group or individual differently because of race. One must remember 
that in 1944 after adopting its so called very rigid strict scrutiny standard 
for race-based classification in Korematsu,115 the Supreme Court gave its 
approval to Congress’s decision to detain Japanese-Americans because 
of their race. While dissenting in Korematsu, Justice Murphy properly 
described the federal government’s denial of civil rights to Japanese-
Americans as racist.116 When America is at war or facing a serious 
national problem, the only constitutional rule that will save an individual 
or a group from state-approved racial discrimination is a law that 
unequivocally prohibits any governmental entity from treating a person 
differently because of his or her race.117
 
V.  THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING IN GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER HAS A 
NEGATIVE IMPACT ON AFRICAN-AMERICANS BECAUSE THE OPINION 
MAY HAVE SENT A MESSAGE THAT RACIAL DIVERSITY EQUALS 
ACCOMMODATING RACIAL INFERIORITY 
 
Regardless of whether one agrees with Professor Bell’s118 theory that 
 111. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 354 (1949). 
 112. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350. (Scalia , J., dissenting, with whom Thomas, J. joins, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 113. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) (holding that any law 
classifying people based on race is subject to the compelling interest and strict scrutiny requirement 
despite the fact that the law is intended to help, rather than harm, minorities); see Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (In Wygant, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion represented the 
rationale of a majority of the Court in concluding that providing minority role models for students 
because of societal discrimination was not a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny 
standard); see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HORNBOOK NO. 
639 (6th ed. West 2000) (stating that in a strict scrutiny review, “the Court will not uphold [a 
government] classification unless the Justices reached the conclusion that the classification is 
necessary, or narrowly tailored, to promote [the government’s compelling interest]”). 
 114. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 111, at 354. 
 115. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (dismissing racial prejudice as an 
underlying motivation for the government action, and instead framing the issue as one requiring 
immediate attention to the “real military dangers which were presented” by Japanese aggression). 
 116. Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 117. See Tussman & tenBrock, supra note 111, at 354. 
 118. Bell, supra note 87, at 524. 
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equality for African-Americans will only be achieved if it serves the 
interest of the white ruling class, it is debatable whether Justice 
O’Connor’s interpretation of the equal protection clause119 in Grutter v. 
Bollinger120 promotes racial equality for African-Americans. According 
to Professor Bell, the Grutter race-based diversity opinion is a serious 
distraction in the continuing efforts to attain equal racial justice for the 
following four reasons.121 First, Professor Bell believes Grutter’s 
rationale for diversity is bad public policy because it allows decision 
makers to avoid confronting the real issues of race and class-based 
discrimination that denies a student an equal opportunity to compete for 
a college admission.122 Second, Professor Bell states that race-based 
college diversity programs invite future litigation because there is no real 
legal basis for approving diversity in college admissions while denying 
race-based preferences in the areas of employment and public 
contracts.123 Justice Scalia’s dissent correctly observes that there is no 
principled basis for expanding the Grutter race-based diversity 
discrimination rationale to public sector employment and other life 
experiences.124 Third, Professor Bell emphasizes race-based diversity in 
college bestows undeserved validity to traditional college admission 
criteria that predominately favors affluent whites.125 Fourth, Professor 
Bell declares the incredible attention given to race-based diversity in 
college admission programs virtually repels any consideration of wealth 
discrimination as a barrier to college admission.126
 119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 120. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337. 
 121. Bell, supra note 90. 
 122. Bell, supra note 90. 
 123. Bell, supra note 90. 
 124. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia, J., dissenting, with whom Thomas, J. joins, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Scalia states: 
If it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use racial discrimination 
for the purpose of putting together a “critical mass” that will convey generic lessons in 
socialization and good citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate—indeed, particularly 
appropriate—for the civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so. There, also, 
those exposed to “critical masses” of certain races will presumably become better 
Americans, better Michiganders, better civil servants. And surely private employers 
cannot be criticized—indeed, should be praised—if they also “teach” good citizenship to 
their adult employees through a patriotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in 
hiring. The nonminority individuals who are deprived of a legal education, a civil service 
job, or any job at all by reason of their skin color will surely understand. 
Id. 
 125. Bell, supra note 90. 
 126. Bell, supra note 90. Bell states: 
With government at every level struggling to manage huge deficits, many colleges are 
suffering deep budget cuts that mean higher tuition and less money available for financial 
aid. A Century Foundation study estimates that if the nation’s most selective colleges 
abandoned affirmative action and looked only at grades and test scores, about 5,000 
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Though Professor Bell’s position that at the end of the day the 
Grutter opinion is bad public policy because it fails to aid in the fight 
against racial injustice,127 the opinion also violates the spirit of the Brown 
v. Board of Education128 decision because the Law School’s race-based 
diversity classification “stamp[s] minorities with a badge of inferiority 
and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that 
they are ‘entitled to preferences.’”129 One of the goals of the equal 
protection clause is to prohibit states from denying “any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”130 In theory, the equal 
protection clause is supposed to be a personal right enjoyed by an 
individual regardless of his or her racial group status because 
“government may treat people differently because of their race only for 
the most compelling reasons.”131 In contemporary America, when race is 
articulated as an intangible factor in the higher education admission 
process for an individual African-American, the merit of the individual 
African-American’s application is lost or marginalized because of 
presumed stereotypical perceptions that his or her racial group status was 
the predominant factor in the admission process.132 Justice O’Connor’s 
race-based diversity rationale is not understood as promoting equality for 
African-Americans by a significant number of Americans because they 
believe that diversity is simply a pretext for a racial preference.133
The irony of the Court’s race-based diversity holding in Grutter is 
fewer black and Hispanic students would make the cut each year; but next year, officials 
estimate that because of budget cuts at least 20,000 black and Hispanic students will be 
shut out of California’s 108 community colleges. One can easily imagine the nationwide 
attrition figures. 
Bell, supra note 90, at 1632. 
 127. See id. 
 128. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 129. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J., joins as to Parts I-VII, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted). 
 130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 131. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 132. See Thomas, Taylor, Rosenberg & Clift, supra note 19, available at 2003 WL 8639381. 
“The [Grutter v. Bollinger] ruling does not really represent a consensus of popular opinion. Most 
Americans say they favor ‘affirmative action’ and oppose ‘quotas’—both loaded terms. But asked 
more neutrally whether they approve ‘racial preferences,’ the answer from both blacks and whites is 
overwhelmingly no.” Id. 
 133. Id. The Newsweek article states: 
O’Connor voted with five other justices to strike down the numerical system used to 
admit Michigan undergraduates. Assigning a twenty-point bonus for skin color seemed to 
smack of quotas. But O’Connor and four others voted to uphold the law school’s 
admission system, which is less blatant but nonetheless affords a clear racial preference. 
An African-American with a B-minus average in college has about the same chance of 
admission to Michigan Law as a white or an Asian with an A average. 
Id. 
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that it may have breathed new life into the harmful message134 that 
African-Americans are academically inferior135 and cannot compete at 
elite colleges.136 Fifty years ago in Brown,137 the Supreme Court made it 
clear that states were not to send any messages to students that they were 
inferior in the education process because of their race. The real 
foreseeable harm caused by African-Americans leaders insisting on race-
based affirmative action is the harmful message of racial inferiority that 
we are passing on to the next generation of African-Americans. William 
Raspberry, a highly regarded African-American journalist, has also 
expressed concern about whether race-based affirmative action sends a 
message of racial inferiority to young African-Americans.138 Because 
Mr. Raspberry is probably in denial about the harmful side effects of 
race-based discrimination in the name of affirmative action, he will not 
fully accept his own preliminary conclusion “that because their elders 
and advocates insist on racial preferences as a policy far into the future, 
our young people may be internalizing a sense of racial inferiority.”139 
 134. Cynthia Tucker, Defeating Prejudices of Critics, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), July 1, 
2003, Three Star Edition, at MAIN A9, available at LEXIS, Major Newspaper, MAJPAP File. Ms. 
Tucker states: 
Occasionally, critics of affirmative action will try to persuade me to drop my support for 
affirmative action programs, contending that such efforts taint me and other black 
professionals with assumptions of incompetence. No matter how talented or 
accomplished I may be, they say, some will always wonder whether I was given good 
jobs simply because I’m black. 
  With the Supreme Court’s ruling last week backing affirmative action in college 
admissions, that argument is once again making the rounds. Indeed, Justice Clarence 
Thomas, who disagreed with the court’s majority, holds the view that affirmative action 
taints its beneficiaries. 
  In his dissent, he quoted black abolitionist Frederick Douglass to make the point: 
“And if the negro (sic) cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. . . . Let him 
alone! . . . Your interference is doing him positive injury.” 
Id. 
 135. Id. (“[S]uccessful blacks . . . have been subject to the slander of inferiority for the last 
400 years, well before the term ‘affirmative action’ became part of the political lexicon.”) 
 136. Id. Less than a decade ago, two whites, Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, wrote an 
845-page screed, “The Bell Curve,” arguing that blacks are intellectually inferior. Id. 
 137. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). The Court in Brown stated: 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon 
the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the 
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the 
negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. 
Id. 
 138. William Raspberry, Editorial, Affirmative Approach, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2004 at A17, 
available at 2004 WL 55829210. 
 139. Id. Raspberry relates the following: 
I recently asked my black students at Duke University how long they thought racial 
preference would be necessary. To my amazement, several of them answered, in essence, 
“Forever.” What—perhaps over extrapolating from a tiny—sample could account for this 
new pessimism? Two things, I suspect. First, we black Americans have changed our 
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Some college students are using race-based affirmative action policies in 
the higher education admission process at elite colleges to advance the 
view that African-Americans are not paying their merit dues by receiving 
special accommodation because of the diversity academic handout given 
in the admission process to African-Americans in spite of their inferior 
grades and substandard test scores.140 On September 24, 2003, Southern 
Methodist University closed down a bake sale that sold cookies for 
different prices based on the buyer’s race or gender.141 “The sign said 
white males had to pay $1 for a cookie. White women: 75 cents. 
Hispanics: 50 cents. Blacks: a quarter. The event Tuesday at Southern 
Methodist University was no PTA bake sale.”142
The point of allowing an African-American to buy a cookie for one-
fourth of what a white has to pay for the same cookie is designed to send 
measure of success. A quarter century ago, we looked to the achievable goal of a 
substantial decrease in racial discrimination. Today, we look to the far more difficult goal 
of eliminating racism. The second, though less certain in my own mind, is that because 
their elders and advocates insist on racial preferences as a policy far into the future, our 
young people may be internalizing a sense of inferiority. They respond by displacing the 
responsibility for their shortcomings to the white dominated society. But the implication 
is that [African-Americans] are permanently damaged goods, in permanent need of 
special concessions. 
Id. 
 140. Lynda K. Wertheimer, SMU Halts Race-Based Bake Sale; To Protest Affirmative Action, 
Group Set Prices Using Ethnicity, Gender, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 2003, Second 
Edition, at METRO 1B, available at LEXIS, Major Newspaper, MAJPAP File. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. Wetheimer reported that: 
The Young Conservatives of Texas chapter ran its so-called affirmative action bake sale 
to protest the use of race or gender as a factor in college admissions. Other groups have 
held similar sales at colleges around the country since February. 
  . . .Matt Houston, a sophomore, said the group’s sign, which listed prices for the 
treats according to the race and sex of buyers, was not a learning tool. It was offensive, he 
said. 
  “My reaction was disgust because of the ignorance of some SMU students,” said 
Mr. Houston, who is black. “They were arguing that affirmative action was solely based 
on race. It’s not based on race. It’s based on bringing a diverse community to a certain 
organization.” 
  He and Kambira Jones, a 20-year-old junior, both expressed their concerns to SMU 
officials. “When I saw this, I was like, ‘I can’t believe they let you guys post this,’” she 
said. “I felt they were attempting to make Hispanics and blacks feel inferior. We jumped 
over the same hoops to get there.” 
  SMU’s freshman class this year is one of its most diverse ever – 20 percent of 
students are minorities. Overall, minority enrollment among the school’s 10,000-member 
student body is 19 percent. 
  Before the bake sale brouhaha, SMU already was planning a forum so students and 
other could debate the aftermath of the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on affirmative 
action. The court ruled in June that universities could use race as a factor in admissions 
under limited conditions. The ruling changes the landscape in Texas, where universities 
have been banned from using race as a factor since 1996. 
Id. 
  
161] TAINTED DIVERSITY PRIZE 183 
 
a message symbolizing the educational and economic inferiority of the 
African-American group in higher education in a manner similar to the 
way the separate but equal race-based laws were “usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the [African-American] group.”143 The cookie 
sale on college campuses is designed to equate racial diversity with racial 
inferiority in higher education for specific minorities while 
simultaneously characterizing more affluent whites as the innocent 
victims of reverse racial diversity discrimination. 
While keeping one’s eyes on the value of the tainted racially 
discriminatory diversity prize in higher education and its mixed message 
of academic racial inferiority and token racial educational reparations 
poorly disguised as racial diversity, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Grutter is further complicating the concept of evaluating African-
American educational advancement without offering a practical solution 
free of race discrimination. Historically, “one of the most fiercely 
contested issues in education”144 has been how to calculate African-
American progress.145
African-Americans supporting diversity in higher education based on 
race are in denial about the general nature of many white Americans 
toward African-Americans as a group. Based on traditional cultural 
heritage, and economic and social dynamics, white Americans see 
African-Americans as a group as presumptively possessing all of the 
negative stereotypes associated with being black in America. Because 
many whites view African-Americans as a group as inherently 
 143. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 144. R. Scott Baker, The Paradoxes of Desegregation: Race, Class, and Education, 1935-
1975, AM. J. EDUC., May 2001, at 321. 
 145. Id. 
More than a century later, measuring African-American progress has become one of the 
most fiercely contested issues in education. Surveying an educational landscape defined 
by greater access for advantaged blacks and the continued isolation of most African-
Americans, scholars tend to emphasize one of these realities at the expense of the other. 
Optimists argue that African-Americans have made dramatic and durable educational 
progress. The most significant gains, David Tyack and Larry Cuban (1995) show, have 
been fueled by the desegregation of schools, colleges, and universities. Drawing on a 
generation of scholarship in sociology, Amy Stuart Wells and Robert Crain contend that 
African-Americans who attend predominantly white educational institutions achieve 
more and “are more likely to go on to college and secure high-status jobs” (Wells and 
Crain 1997, p.1). Pessimists reject this portrait of unproblematic progress, arguing that 
desegregation may well have done more harm than good. Vanessa Siddle Walker (2000) 
contends that during the first half of the twentieth century African-Americans fashioned 
educational environments that motivated students to excel and achieve their highest 
potential. Harold Cruse (1987) and Derrick Bell (1992) assert that because these 
nurturing educational environments were dismantled, desegregation failed to narrow 
educational gaps or alter educational status of most blacks. Where optimists see progress 
pessimists find regress. 
Id. 
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intellectually inferior to whites as a group it is educational suicide for 
African-Americans as a group to endorse a race-based policy of 
educational preference for blacks on the presumptive theory that African-
Americans are intellectually inferior because of either their grades or 
scores on standardized tests. If reasonable African-Americans can accept 
the theory that many whites engage in the presumption that African-
Americans as a group possess the stereotypical trait of being 
intellectually inferior to whites, African-Americans should not be 
shocked by the conclusion that many whites support race-based 
affirmative action as a necessary evil to accommodate the presumed 
intellectually inferior status of African-Americans.146
According to Professor Freedman, a journalism professor at 
Columbia University, affluent parents created the affirmative action or 
diversity concept to allow racial minorities to enter elite universities on a 
separate but unequal admission standard because those minorities 
admitted were presumed to be inferior.147 The conservative Justice 
Thomas has also consistently tried to warn the African-American 
community that race-based affirmative action programs like the one 
established by the Law School classify African-Americans as inferior.148
Author Ellis Cose is a supporter of race-based affirmative action.149 
Cose tells an eloquent story about the plight of a hypothetical brown boy 
that suffered racial harassment because he was given a five-yard 
advantage at the start of a race.150 Cose’s story makes the case against 
race-based preferences for people who want to trade the long-term 
harmful psychological message to their children of the racial inferiority 
generally associated with race-based affirmative action for the immediate 
benefit of a very small number of selected African-American race-based 
affirmative action admittees.151 In Cose’s hypothetical, a brown 
 146. Samuel G. Freedman, ‘Legacy’ Admissions Ban Highlights Flaws in System, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 22, 2004, at A15, available at 2004 WL58549864. Samuel Freedman is a professor of 
journalism at Columbia University and has lately written, Jew vs. Jew: The Struggle for the Soul of 
American Jewry. Freedman serves on the USA TODAY’s board of contributors. He has stated: 
Affluent parents collectively have paid hundreds of millions of dollars to enroll their 
children in test-prep classes, buying the appearance of merit. At the other end of the 
process, college officials found themselves torn between the rhetoric of meritocracy and 
the reality that blacks and Hispanics scored far below whites on standardized tests. So, 
under the names of ‘affirmative action’ or ‘diversity,’ they cooked up a parallel 
admissions track premised on pity, meaning minorities who entered their institutions did 
so with the presumption of inferiority. 
Id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2363-64 (2003) (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J., 
joins as to Parts I-VII, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 149. Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class, 111-33 (Harper Perennial 1995). 
 150. See id. at 132-33. 
 151. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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unpopular child has a goal of becoming a runner.152 The brown child’s 
peers decline to allow him to practice running on their track.153 One day a 
track official observes the troubles of the brown boy and chooses to give 
the boy an opportunity to run in the scheduled public races.154 The track 
official states the other children are not required to let the brown boy 
practice with them but they are required to the let the brown boy run in 
the scheduled races.155 Because the brown boy was not allowed to 
practice running with the other children the track official required the 
other children to provide the brown boy with a five-yard head start.156 
The story explains that: 
 
Though the official has given a very public and heartfelt explanation 
for the special treatment, loudmouths in the bleachers focus 
increasingly on the unfairness of brown kid’s head start. Why is it 
necessary? . . . Could he be genetically inferior? . . . Is something in his 
culture keeping him from keeping up?157
 
Loving and caring parents in Cose’s hypothetical would not knowingly 
subject the brown boy to such racial harassment and unnecessarily 
assume the risk of creating an inferiority complex in the brown boy for a 
temporary advantage at the expense of the brown boy’s self respect. The 
African-American experience has demonstrated time and time again that 
African-Americans have excelled and won the respect of others when 
they have performed beyond the expectations of others in spite of racial 
discrimination when given an opportunity to compete on an equal basis 
of nondiscrimination. For example, in an age of tremendous racial 
Thomas states: 
It is uncontested that each year, the Law School admits a handful of blacks who would be 
admitted in the absence of racial discrimination. See Brief for Respondents Bollinger et 
al. 6. Who can differentiate between those who belong and those who do not? The 
majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and because 
of this policy all are tarred as undeserving. This problem of stigma does not depend on 
determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the “beneficiaries” of racial 
discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry, 
or academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part in their 
advancement. The question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimination did 
play a role, in which case the person may be deemed “otherwise unqualified,” or it did 
not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would 
succeed without discrimination. 
Id. 
 152. Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class, 132-33 (Harper Perennial 1995). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 133. 
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prejudice in the 1930s, an African-American sports hero Jesse Owens158 
 158. Mark Heisler, Atlanta 1996 / 50 Days To The Games Brothers in Sport Despite 
Differences, Jesse Owens, Luz Long Struck up Friendship at 1936 Berlin Olympics, L.A. TIMES, 
May 30,1996, available at 1996 WL 10506653. Heisler describes Owens’ achievements as follows: 
The lessons of history, as Marge Schott reminds us, are soon forgotten. It’s been 60 years 
since Jesse Owens’ performance at the Berlin Olympics, an event that now seems as 
much a part of our national lore as the Pilgrims landing at Plymouth Rock, and as distant. 
  It began as a Nazi pageant and turned into a drama that seemed to presage the 
American triumph in World War II Owens winning the 100 meters . . . Adolf Hitler 
snubbing him . . . a German long jumper named Luz Long daring to openly befriend the 
black American . . . Owens massing four gold medals in a powerful advertisement of the 
glory of a free society. 
  “He just had that kind of carriage,” says Owens’ widow, Ruth, wistfully. “Look 
how long he’s lasted. Jesse’s been dead for 16 years and he gets more publicity now than 
a lot of athletes who are participating this year. 
  “Sometimes I have to just sit and tears come to my eyes when I think about it. You 
say to yourself, ‘Well, gee, he had to be a heck of a fellow to last this long.’” 
Owens was, indeed, special. He set an indoor sprint record that lasted 40 years. He set a 
long jump record that lasted longer than Bob Beamon’s. But he was more than an athlete. 
For a moment, Owens embodied the spirit of a rising young nation and the things he saw 
and did will never be forgotten. 
  . . . . 
  In the first place, the United States in 1936 was only “free” or “open” in a relative 
sense. 
  American society was still widely segregated. The armed services wouldn’t be 
integrated for 12 more years and until then there were quotas for black enlistees, who 
were often steered away from combat. In segments of the country, blacks went to 
“separate but equal” schools; the Supreme Court wouldn’t mandate integration for 18 
more years. 
  . . . . 
  Baker’s biography, “An American Life,” notes that just before Owens arrived in 
1933, the NAACP had sued Ohio State, claiming that two black students had been denied 
campus housing. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Owens never lived in campus housing, boarding with other black students and, 
after he and Ruth married, moving in with her cousin, Fannie. 
Blacks could not eat in the restaurants along High Street, adjacent to the university, nor 
attend the movie theaters. . . . 
  Owens, a prodigy, made the Olympic team in his junior year. There was growing 
uneasiness among competing nations about the political overtones but if Jesse was 
worried about it, he gave no sign. 
  . . . . 
  “He was very young and he had to work very hard to make the Olympic team. I 
don’t think Hitler or anything else could have kept him away. You know athletes, they 
don’t see color. And he had been an athlete all his life.” 
  . . . . 
  Nazi party newspapers predicted German Olympic victories that would confirm 
Hitler’s race theory. The blacks on the American team were called “black auxiliaries.” 
  . . . . 
  Owens won the 100 meters. 
  . . . . 
  Owens won his second gold in the long jump. 
  . . . . 
  Owens won his third gold medal in the 200 meters, then ran the leadoff leg of the 
  
161] TAINTED DIVERSITY PRIZE 187 
 
did not need a five-yard advantage; he only needed an opportunity free of 
race discrimination to compete as one athlete among equals.159 One can 
only imagine Jesse Owens’s fate in the 1936 Olympics if he had asked 
for a five-yard advantage in the 100 meters and the 200 meters events 
because he was a victim of racial discrimination and “[t]he son of 
sharecroppers and grandson of slaves.”160 All Americans should now be 
grateful that Jesse Owens did not ask for a five-yard affirmative action 
advantage at the 1936 Olympics in Hitler’s Germany.161 In 1936, I would 
have rejected the argument that African-Americans are inferior athletes 
and in 2004 I equally reject the contention that African Americans are 
academically inferior. 
The brown boy in Cose’s162 story should follow the lead of Jesse 
Owens. Jesse Owens ran a good race in life without asking for a five-
yard advantage while living in a presumptive racist society in America. 
Cose has placed his brown boy in a race with a five-yard race-based 
advantage that the boy can only accept if he is willing to assume the risk 
of losing confidence in himself and his self-respect.163 Unlike the brown 
boy, Jesse Owens was never at risk of losing his self-respect because he 
never received a five-yard advantaged America in 1936 that was 
disrespectful to Jesse Owens by giving him “a ticker tape parade when he 
returned to America but had to ride the freight elevator to a reception in 
his honor at the Waldorf-Astoria.”164 Cose concludes that the brown boy 
realizes that he will never win his race even with a five-yard start 
400 –meter relay for the fourth. The Southern-born Wolfe, watching the 200 in the box of 
the American ambassador, let out a loud whoop. 
  “Owens was black as tar,” Wolfe was later quoted by his biographer, Andrew 
Turnbull, “but what the hell, it was our team and I thought he was wonderful.” 
Id. 
 159. Gerald Tebben, Ohio MilePosts, Aug. 9, 1936; Jesse Owens Defeats The Nazis, THE 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Aug. 9, 2003, at 3B, available at 2003 WL 59884554. Tebben states: 
The son of sharecroppers and grandson of slaves, Jesse Owens was an Ohio State 
University student in 1936 when he won a berth on the U.S. Olympic Team and a ticket 
to Berlin. Adolf Hitler planned to make the Olympics a showplace of Aryan superiority. 
When black athletes showed early signs of dominating some events, he retreated. 
  On the first morning of competition, Hitler received German and Finnish gold-
medal winners in his private box to the roaring approval of the crowd. That afternoon, 
U.S. black athlete Cornelius Johnson won the high jump. Before the national anthem 
could be played, Hitler left the stadium. Aides said the departure had been prearranged. 
The New York Times headlined it as a snub. 
Id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class, 133 (Harper Perennial 1995). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. “When I came back to my native country, after all the stories about Hitler, I couldn’t 
ride in the front of the bus,” Owens said. “I had to go to the back door. I couldn’t live where I 
wanted.” Id. 
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because of the hostile reaction of the crowd to him having the five-yard 
advantage.165According to Cose, his brown boy “doesn’t know whether 
he should ask for a bigger lead, give up the one he has, or simply 
abandon the race.”166
What recommendations should be given to the little brown boy? 
First, the little brown boy should not ask for a bigger lead because it will 
only generate more hostility from the mob watching from an artificial 
advantage.167 Second, the little brown boy should receive a brief black 
history lesson and be told not to abandon his race in 2004 because Jesse 
Owens did not abandon his race.168 Third, the little brown boy should 
give up the false five-yard advantage at that elite track field because that 
false advantage may serve as a pretext to destroy his confidence and self-
respect. Finally, the little brown boy needs to be taken by his hands to a 
loving and caring coach. The coach’s job is to take the little brown boy 
to good track fields that may not be elite but on those track fields he can 
train free of racial discrimination to be the next Jesse Owens with honor 
and respect for his African-American heritage. 
 
VI.  THE IMPLICATION OF RACE-NEUTRAL COLLEGE LEGACY 
PREFERENCES FOR FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE CONTEXT OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 
 
As a general rule, whites who openly oppose race discriminatory 
affirmative action do not oppose race-neutral preferences. In the context 
of higher education, legacy may be defined as an admissions label 
utilized by the majority of private colleges and a number of public 
universities for hopeful candidates who received a certain amount of 
preferential treatment because family members previously attended the 
school.169 Over the last three decades many thoughtful Americans have 
considered college admissions as a rather simple offer. Many in the silent 
majority believed that whites were admitted to colleges based on merit 
because of their superior standardized test scores. One could be admitted 
based on a racial preference if she is not white. For thirty years we were 
led to believe that college admission decisions were either based on test 
scores or skin color.170
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Tebben, supra note 159. 
 169. Danna Harman, Family Ties: An Unfair Advantage? Amid Debate over Racial 
Preferences, Legacy Admissions are Suddenly Cast in a Harsher Light, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0206/p13s01-legn.html. 
 170. Id. 
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The recent decision by Texas A&M University to discontinue 
awarding race-neutral legacy preferences to the relatives of alumni has 
introduced a needed dose of truth serum into the conversation about the 
impact of preferences in college admissions.171 The Texas A&M family 
legacy debate provides an opportunity to inform most Americans that 
there are all sorts of unearned advantages in the admission process with 
legacy status being one of the most common.172 According to one 
commentator, the Texas A&M family legacy preference program raises 
questions about our college admission system that is riddled with 
cynicism and deceit.173
As a nation we have to ask whether the emphasis on supposed merit 
in college admissions has been a lie, a failure, or both.174 A significant 
number of whites are opposed to race-based preferences for African-
Americans in the higher educational arena because they equate racial 
preferences with providing an opportunity for a specific racial minority 
who did not measure up according to the accepted normal academic 
standards.175 Whites opposing race-based reverse discrimination often 
view race-based affirmative action as the road to career success for 
unqualified African-Americans.176
However, many whites that support race-based affirmative action 
also support race-neutral legacy affirmative action based on family 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Freedman, supra note 146. 
 174. Freedman, supra note 146. 
 175. Will, supra note 100. 
 176. Cose, supra note 149, at 111. Cose states: 
When the talk turns to affirmative action, I often recall a conversation from years ago. A 
young white man, a Harvard student and the brother of a close friend, happened to be in 
Washington when the Supreme Court ruled on an affirmative action question. I have long 
since forgotten the question and the Court’s decision, but I remember the young man’s 
reaction. 
  He was not only troubled but choleric at the very notion that “unqualified 
minorities” would dare to demand preferential treatment. Why, he wanted to know, 
couldn’t they compete like everyone else? Why should hardworking whites like himself 
be pushed aside for second-rate affirmative action hires? Why should he be discriminated 
against in order to accommodate them? His tirade went on for quite a while, and he 
became more indignant by the second as he conjured up one injustice after another. 
  When the young man paused to catch his breath, I took the occasion to observe that 
it seemed more than a bit hypocritical of him to rage on about preferential treatment. A 
person of modest intellect, he had gotten into Harvard largely on the basis of family 
connections. His first summer internship, with the White House, had been arranged by a 
family member. His second, with the World Bank, had been similarly arranged. Thanks 
to his nice internship and Harvard degree, he had been promised a coveted slot in a major 
company’s executive training program. In short, he was already well on his way to a 
distinguished career—a career made possible by preferential treatment. 
Cose, supra note 149, at 111 (emphasis in original). 
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ties.177 Race-neutral reverse affirmative action is “a practice as old as 
colleges themselves, and is intended to boost alumni support and 
donations and foster a sense of community.”178 Senator John Edwards, 
the Democratic vice presidential candidate, has repeatedly criticized 
legacies as an aristocratic birthright that is not consistent with American 
democracy and he argues that the legacy practice should be prohibited.179 
After the 2003 Grutter decision giving limited approval to race-
conscious affirmative-action admissions, lawmakers are now beginning 
to evaluate whether legacy is a form of “reverse affirmative action, 
which gives an edge to those whose parents and grandparents went to 
selective colleges at a time when most minorities there were few and far 
between.”180 Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts has been 
classified as a member of the Harvard legacy181 and is not a champion of 
the legacy practice.182 Kennedy has proposed federal legislation 
commanding colleges to reveal the race and economic rank of first-year 
students with family ties to alumni.183 The Massachusetts Senator 
anticipates that his legacy disclosure law “would force colleges to reveal 
how the preferences disproportionately benefit affluent white students, 
and might embarrass them into limiting such preferences on their 
own.”184
Race-neutral legacies should not automatically be ended as a form of 
 177. Danna Harman, Family Ties: An Unfair Advantage? Amid Debate over Racial 
Preferences, Legacy Admissions are Suddenly Cast in a Harsher Light, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0206/p13s01-legn.html. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. Harman explains that: 
Then, last month, Texas A&M University, under pressure to review its legacy policies 
after it dropped its affirmative-action program, announced that the school would not wait 
for a law to tell it what to do - and abolished the practice, fueling the debate even further. 
  . . . . 
  Texas A&M’s legacy policy is far from unique. Amherst College in Massachusetts, 
for example, accepts nearly half of alumni children who apply, compared with 17 percent 
of all applicants. Sons and daughters of alumni make up more than 10 percent of students 
at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton and a whopping 23 percent at Notre Dame. While legacy 
students are becoming more diverse, reflecting the surge in minority enrollment in the 
1970s, whites still make up the vast majority. At Harvard last year, only 7.6 percent of 
legacy applicants accepted were black, Hispanic or Native American, compared with 17.8 
percent of all successful applicants. 
  But, far from following A&M’s lead, most universities across the country are 
chafing at the idea of additional restrictions on their admissions policies and speaking out 
against the Kennedy bill. 
Id. 
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reverse discrimination favoring whites. The traditional legacy concept 
should be expanded to include nontraditional students on a basis that 
does not include race-based discrimination. For example, those with 
family ties to economic disadvantaged athletes could be awarded “super 
legacy points.” Family members of former college athletes who played in 
sports that generate super profits for the college should be entitled to 
super legacy points.185 Those colleges and universities with an 
established tradition of awarding legacy points may find other creative 
ways to give super legacy points free of practicing race discrimination to 
relatives of athletes. At Penn, the legacy practice is taken seriously; at 
Michigan, a legacy status will earn you extra points; Harvard admits that 
the legacy issue is not ignored; and Notre Dame concedes that it is very 
legacy friendly.186 If Penn, Michigan, Harvard, and Notre Dame 
announced that they were awarding super legacy points to family 
members of former athletes who entered their respective schools as 
economically disadvantaged, others might follow their lead. Duke 
University Provost Peter Lange contends that establishing alumni loyalty 
with a legacy admissions policy helps universities to fund plans that 
increase racial diversity.187
By awarding super legacy points to the relatives of economically 
disadvantaged athletes, colleges with a traditional legacy program will 
simply be creating one more athletic-related exception to the concept of 
true merit criteria in the admission process.188 One who rejects the 
advocacy of super legacy points for economically disadvantaged athletes 
as lacking academic merit based on standardized test scores and grades 
might warm up to super legacy points because such an advocate of “true 
meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by 
numerous exceptions to “merit”189 based on test scores and grades. 
According to Justice Thomas, the national debate about the use of racial 
preferences in higher education reveals that elite colleges and 
universities use “‘legacy’ preferences to give the children of alumni an 
 185. Julia Silverman, College Spending on Sports Under Fire, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 10, 
2004, available at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040210/ap_on_sp_co 
_ne/fbc_spending_on_sports_1. The Silverman article states: 
Supporters of college athletics . . . [argue] that college sports are big business, like it or 
not. Moneymaking sports like men’s football and basketball often underwrite other 
college athletic teams, from squash to soccer. And universities say fancy stadiums, arenas 
and locker rooms help them recruit star athletes and attract fans and donors. 
Id. 
 186. Harman, supra note 169. 
 187. Harman, supra note 169. 
 188. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2359 (2003) (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J., 
joins as to Parts I-VII, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 189. Id. 
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advantage in admissions.”190 Justice Thomas identified legacy preference 
as one type of exception to “true” meritocracy that allows him to 
conclude that merit admissions are “not the order of the day at the 
nation’s universities.”191 Justice Thomas appears not to endorse legacy 
preferences because he describes them as “unseemly.”192
Although Justice Thomas suggests that legacies are not appropriate, 
he said, “I will not twist the Constitution to invalidate legacy 
preferences.”193 In an ideal world, the concept of legacy preferences 
might not be preferred, but legacy preferences that include a preference 
for relatives of disadvantaged athletes because the Equal Protection 
Clause does not prohibit the traditional race-neutral legacy program.194 
The Equal Protection Clause would only prohibit an arbitrary legacy 
admission preference program that treated similar situated legacies 
differently because the lack of any conceivable reasonable state interest 
would violate equal protection principles under the Court’s rationale 
articulated in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.195
 
VII.  WHITES-ONLY SCHOLARSHIP IS AN UNFORTUNATE FORESEEABLE 
CONSEQUENCE OF RACE EXCLUSIVE SCHOLARSHIP FOR THE BENEFIT OF 
OTHER RACIAL GROUPS 
 
As a southern African-American male and native of Mississippi, I 
disapprove of all state sponsored race-based discrimination. I am not at 
all surprised that some white students dislike reverse discrimination by 
the government when they are asked to bear the burden of race 
discrimination in the name of diversity. For example, students at Roger 
Williams University are proposing a scholarship for only white 
students.196 The students contend that the whites-only scholarship is 
intended to protest race-based affirmative action in higher education.197 
“Jason Mattera, 20, who is president of the College Republicans, said the 
group is parodying minority scholarships. ‘White kids are at a handicap,’ 
Mattera told the Providence Journal. ‘Handing out scholarships based on 
someone’s color is absurd.’”198 Mattera has Puerto Rican ancestry and is 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 2360. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 196. Student Group Offers Whites-Only Scholarship, AP, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2004, at A7, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44488-2004Feb15.html. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. “The application for the $250 award requires an essay on ‘why you are proud of your 
white heritage’ and a recent picture to ‘confirm whiteness.’ ‘Evidence of bleaching will disqualify 
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the beneficiary of a $5,000 scholarship available for minority students.199 
“No matter what my ethnicity is, I’m making a statement that 
scholarships should be given out based on merit and need,” he said.200
Affirmative action scholarships based on criteria that do not include 
racial discrimination are favorable. Unlike Julian Bonds, the Chairman of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the 
goal of affirmative action is not “about removing the preferences that 
white people have enjoyed for centuries.”201 Affirmative action should 
expand the preferences traditionally enjoyed by whites to include 
African-Americans and other historically disadvantaged groups based on 
criteria free of racial discrimination. Historically, white colleges with 
elite college sports programs have been successful in recruiting African-
American athletes on a race-neutral basis to serve on their money-
making sports teams. If historically white colleges can succeed in 
recruiting minority athletes on a race-neutral basis, America’s elite 
colleges can also succeed in recruiting non-athlete African-American 
college students to their college campuses on a race-neutral basis if they 
act in good faith. Though Julian Bonds is misguided about the goal of 
race-based affirmative action, Bonds is correct in the view that “it has 
been only a short 39 years that all black Americans have exercised the 
full rights of citizens, only 39 years since legal segregation was ended 
nationwide, only 39 years since the right to register to vote was 
universally guaranteed.”202 It is clearly implausible to conclude “those 39 
years have been enough”203 to overcome the historical vestiges of racial 
slavery. But the remedy for racial slavery and racial discrimination is to 
applicants,’ says the application, issued by the university’s College Republicans.” Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Clarke Morrison, Civil Rights Pioneer Bond: ‘Righteous War’ Must Continue; NAACP 
Chairman Defends Affirmative Action During UNCA Speech, ASHVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES (NC), Feb. 
7, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 60195897. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. Clarke Morrison states: 
“American slavery was a human horror of staggering dimensions,” Bond said. “The 
profits it produced endowed great fortunes and enriched generations.” Centuries of 
slavery were followed by 100 years of state sanctioned discrimination, reinforced by 
public and private terror, ending only after a protracted struggle in 1965.” 
  When the 20th century began, black people were slaves in every way but legally, he 
said. Most couldn’t vote and attended inadequate, segregated schools. Few owned the 
land they farmed or the homes they lived in. 
  The landmark Brown v. Board of Education court decision in 1954 outlawing racial 
discrimination in public schools was the civil rights movement’s “greatest legal victory 
 . . . the quest for meaningful equality had begun.” The ruling gave license to common 
people to declare segregation immoral and made passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 
possible, which was “democracy’s finest hour.” 
Id. 
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pursue a course of nondiscrimination coupled with a pragmatic plan to 
bridge the economic and education gap between America’s historically 
disadvantaged citizens.  
The inherent danger in requesting scholarship for historically 
disadvantaged African-American students based on race is that it allows 
some members of the historically advantaged white group, or a 
representative of the group, to characterize whites as the new victims of 
reverse invidious discrimination.204 “[I]t is white students today who are 
feeling the backlash of discrimination wielded against them by 
scholarships for non-whites,”205 according to Mattera. Whites who may 
have been embarrassed to articulate the need for a whites-only 
scholarship before Grutter v. Bollinger in a post-Grutter world have been 
given ammunition to declare the white group currently disadvantaged by 
race preferences.206 Although commentator Clarence Page is correct in 
saying there is nothing new about whites-only scholarships, he misses 
the point that the new rationale for whites-only scholarships is to 
symbolize the need to protect whites from the backlash of reverse racial 
discrimination.207 Although some would treat the whites-only 
scholarships as a joke,208 Americans should decline to treat any race-
based discrimination by one group of Americans against another group 
as a laughing matter and should look forward to the day when America 
will say “no” to all race exclusive scholarships.209 That is not to say that 
there should be opposition for scholarships based on reasonable 
preferences that do not include race, scholarships for the poor, and 
scholarships for athletes, band members, hard working students with 
reasonable grades, and for left-handed students. There are so many race-
neutral ways to grant scholarship and admission preferences to 
 204. Clarence Page, There’s Nothing New about Whites-Only Scholarship, CHICAGO TRIB., 
Feb. 18, 2004, available at 2004 WL 69248720. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. Clarence Page relates the following about Mattera: 
“We think that, if you want to treat someone according to character and how well they 
achieve academically, then skin color shouldn’t really be an option,” [Mattera] told the 
Journal. 
  Yet, Mattera, who is of Puerto Rican descent, is himself a recipient of a $5,000 
Sallie Mae Fund scholarship for Hispanic students. 
  How does he square accepting a scholarship for non-whites with his opposition to 
preferential treatment for non-whites. Well, Mattera apparently believes the myth that 
only unqualified people benefit from affirmative action. He told CNN’s Daryn Kagan, for 
example, that his Hispanics-only scholarship was OK because he earned it with his 
excellent grade point average, not “just because I’m Puerto Rican.” 
Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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students210 that only an instigator of reverse racial preferences would find 
race to be a necessary factor in the decision making process. The Rhode 
Island Republican Party correctly disapproves of the whites-only 
scholarship because of its racist overtones.211 However, all race exclusive 
scholarships and admission practices should be condemned because of 
their racist connotations.212
 
 
 
 
 210. Id. Clarence Page describes the following scholarships: 
Take a look at just a few of the other groups that FinAid.com found receive preferences 
under currently available scholarships simply as a consequence of their condition of birth: 
  Left-handed students: The Frederick and Mary F. Beckley Scholarship will award 
up to $1,000 to attending Juniata College, Huntingdon, Pa. 
  Little people: The Little People of America association offers for its members, who 
must be 4-foot-10 or less in height. 
  Tall people: Tall Clubs International offers a $1,000 scholarship to women who are 
at least 5-foot-10 and men who are at least 6-foot-2, presumably in their stocking feet. 
  Just-average people: The David Letterman Scholarship, established by the late-
night TV star, awards scholarships to telecommunications students at his alma mater, Ball 
State University, who are “average students who nevertheless have a creative mind.” 
  Catholics named Zolp: The aptly-named Zolp Scholarship offers full tuition for four 
years at Loyola University in Chicago for Catholic students whose last name happens to 
be Zolp, as documented by their birth certificate and confirmation certificate. First-name 
Zolps need not apply. 
  Anyone named Scarpinato: Full attendance at Texas A&M University is available 
for anyone whose last name is Scarpinato—by birth or by marriage, so you still have a 
chance to marry into this scholarship. 
  Descendants of alumni: There are lots of these, of course, but one of the more 
unusual enables selected incoming freshmen at Hood College in Frederick, Md., the 
opportunity to pay the same first year tuition as their alumnus parent or grandparent. 
Without inflation. 
  Twins and triplets: Lots of these too. But one of the more unusual is offered by 
Lake Erie College in Painesville, Ohio, where each twin gets the scholarship in alternate 
years. 
Id. 
 211. Jennifer Styles, Whites-Only Scholarship Generates Controversy, Feb. 18, 2004, 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/EDUCATION/02/18/whites.only.scholars/index.html. Styles 
reported the following: 
“It all began two weeks ago as a way for the college Republican groups to express their 
opposition and tell people they are against race-based scholarships and affirmative 
action,” June Speakman, faculty adviser for the College Republicans told CNN. 
  “We never expected such an overwhelming response of e-mails and media 
attention.” 
  The scholarship is for $250, but College Republicans president Jason Mattera said 
he has received donations and pledges totaling $4,000 for future whites-only 
scholarships. 
Id. 
 212. L. Darnell Weeden, Just Say No to Race Exclusive Scholarships: From an Afrocentric 
Perspective, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 205 (1995). 
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VIII.  THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR AN EQUITABLE PUBLIC POLICY THAT 
NARROWS THE EDUCATION ACHIEVEMENT GAPS BETWEEN 
HISTORICALLY DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND MIDDLE CLASS NON-
MINORITY STUDENTS 
 
Those committed to finding appropriate means for better educating 
the masses of African-American children should not be afraid to 
reconsider long-held views about the effectiveness of race-based 
affirmative action and racial discrimination as opposed to 
nondiscrimination coupled with a policy of economic equity in education 
for historically disadvantaged children. On Tuesday February 17, 2004, 
Professor John Brittain, my colleague at Texas Southern University, “one 
of the country’s prominent civil rights lawyers and integrationists 
dropped a bombshell”213 by announcing “he is considering abandoning 
his advocacy of integrated public schools.”214 Brittain now suggests the 
focus for quality education for minority school children should consider 
devoting scarce resources in neighborhood schools while making the 
case for affordable housing in communities located in the suburbs.215
Professor Brittain may be reconsidering his life-long commitment to 
school integration as the primary tool for providing African-Americans 
with a quality education. Fifty years after the Brown v. Board of 
Education decision made segregation by law illegal, the objective 
evidence from a current Harvard study216 indicates that the Brown 
decision has not been very successful in ending school segregation and 
inferior education for a majority of African-American children. Fifty 
years after the Supreme Court outlawed school segregation; a 
contemporary Harvard University study concludes “that America’s 
public schools are re-segregating at a pace that brings us back to the 
1960s. And while the academic achievement gap between white and 
minority students began to narrow in the 1980s, it is widening again.”217
 213. Stan Simpson, An Advocate of Integration Reconsiders, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb 18, 
2004, available at http://www.freespeech.com/archives/002004.html. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. Stan Simpson reports: 
John Brittain, the former lead plaintiff’s attorney in Connecticut’s historic Sheff vs. 
O’Neill desegregation lawsuit, said . . . 
  . . . . 
  “The resources, time, money and effort such as we put into Sheff vs. O’Neill, we 
should really invest in trying to improve educational achievement even in all one-race, 
non-white schools. . . . We’ve almost come back to Plessy vs. Ferguson. Separate, and 
trying to make it equal.” 
  Wow! Quite a turnaround for a guy who for most of his career insisted that a quality 
education begins with an integrated classroom. 
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During a February 2004 forum analyzing the Brown decision, 
Richard L. Schwab, the University of Connecticut Dean of Education, 
presented research showing that the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress has determined “that the average African-American and Latino 
17-year-old has the equivalent education of a 13-year-old white kid in 
math and reading.”218 As we attempt to close the educational 
achievement gap between white, African-American, and Latino students, 
we must seriously consider the economic affirmative action remedy of 
equitable school financing for all students regardless of the property 
value in their economically inferior urban neighborhood or rural 
community.219 A level playing field for all of America’s school children 
demands economic affirmative action to reform school financing to 
insure all American children have an equitable education that is at least 
competitive with that of the average middle class white school child in 
the affected state.220
  . . . . 
  . . . [Britain] still values integration and is by no means promoting separatism. He’s 
simply saying that the lack of progress in public school integration in the past 50 years is 
giving him pause. 
Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Anna Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy Debate: Implications For 
Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 134 (2003). Shavers states: 
Nearly fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court issued its decision in Brown, yet 
many children continue to be deprived of an equal education opportunity. . . . In this 
effort to receive an equal education opportunity for students who have been deprived of 
that right, lawsuits have been commenced in all but 5 of the 50 states. These challenges 
on the basis of a denial of equal education opportunity to students in the state have moved 
from a focus on racial discrimination, to the state-created finance formulas that determine 
how much each school district has to spend on education. Traditionally, the funding 
formula that provides basic state aid to school districts consists primarily of property 
taxes imposed at the local level. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 220. See id. Shavers explains: 
The amount available for per-pupil expenditure generally depends upon two main 
components: (1) the amount contributed to each school district from the state collected 
revenue and (2) the amount generated from taxable real estate in the local school district. 
The claim in school finance litigation has been that equalization of educational 
opportunities requires the establishment of a financing system that does not directly link a 
district’s per pupil expenditure to its taxable wealth. While in response to claims of denial 
of equal education opportunity, the states could demonstrate that they had not 
deliberately configured school districts to maintain racially separate schools and schools 
that were noticeably inferior if attended by minority students, challengers asserted they 
could demonstrate that states created financing systems that resulted in an inferior 
education to students in districts that had less real property wealth than those with more 
real property wealth. Often the argument was that minority children resided in the 
property poor districts. The references here to school finance concern education revenue 
and payments for instruction, support services, and other activities for kindergarten 
through high school (K-12). This includes the operation of public schools, teachers’ 
salaries, construction of school buildings, the purchase and operation of school buses, and 
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While campaigning for the Democratic Presidential nomination, 
Senator John Edwards of North Carolina described “2 Public School 
Systems” in America as wrong.221 According to Senator Edwards, 
America has “two public school systems, one for the haves and one for 
everybody else.”222 Public schools in poor communities do not perform 
as well as those in rich communities.223 At least one commentator 
believes that “Mr. Edwards has won praise for sticking so doggedly to 
his standard theme of two Americas divided by class.”224
Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter v. Bollinger that “the use of 
racial preferences” to support racial diversity in higher education will no 
longer be necessary in twenty-five years225 is a pipe dream unless 
America is willing to equitably finance a top quality public education 
system for all of its children including those in the educational diversity 
pipeline from pre-kindergarten thru high school. Race-based affirmative 
action will still be necessary under Justice O’Connor’s rationale226 if 
America continues its current two public schools systems for the affluent 
and financially disadvantaged because the students in the under-funded, 
predominately poor and minority school pipeline will still not be 
competitive with those who have attended elite public schools from pre-
kindergarten until high school graduation. 
Professor Suzanne E. Eckes has taken the position that the Grutter 
rationale that diversity is a compelling state interest for purposes of race-
based college admissions should apply to K-12 educational admission 
programs.227 Applying the race-based diversity admission program to K-
12 students is not likely to promote an end to the race-based admission 
programs at the college level in the year 2028. Substituting race-based 
classifications that are not compelling is a poor substitute for a rational, 
adequately funded program, free of racial discrimination designed to 
other services. 
  Claims of lack of equity developed around the theory that all districts should 
receive a relatively equal level of resources, based on relative need. The need for, and 
complexities of, school finance reform has been considered by numerous scholars, 
advocates and economists. 
Id. at 134-35. 
 221. Jim Rutenberg, The AD Campaign : Edwards Highlights His Theme of Two Americas, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/27/ politics/campaign/ 
27ADBO.html?n=Top%2fNews%2fWashington%2fCampaign%202004%2fCandidates%2fJohn%2
0Edwards. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Suzanne E. Eckes, How Will the Grutter and Gratz Affirmative Action Decisions Impact 
K-12 Diversity Plans?, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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insure a quality education for all of America’s children. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent correctly and appropriately accused the Court in 
Grutter of reciting the strict scrutiny analysis for race-based 
classifications, but failing to apply strict scrutiny because the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits the means actually used by law schools.228 
Justice Kennedy is absolutely correct in concluding that the Court simply 
fails to apply the strict scrutiny standard. “By trying to say otherwise, it 
undermines both the test and its own controlling precedents.”229
Anyone serious about ending race-based affirmative action under the 
Court’s Grutter rationale must address social issues far broader than 
equity in financing public schools so as to create competitive educational 
opportunities for all students.230 To make Justice O’ Connor’s dream of 
ending race-based affirmative action for college admission a reality by 
the year 2028, Lisbeth B. Schorr estimates “that it would cost between 
$110 billion and $125 billion a year” if one excludes the cost of universal 
health care.231 Schorr believes that it is necessary to have universal health 
care if race-based affirmative action discrimination is to end in 25 
years.232 Schorr refers to Justice O’Connor’s goal of ending the need for 
race-based affirmative action in colleges in 25 years as the O’ Connor 
project.233 Schorr properly concludes that America can end racial 
discrimination in affirmative action with an effective race-neutral policy 
for ending racial disparities if it is willing to invest the financial 
resources necessary to eliminate racial disparities at critical stages in a 
person’s life.234
 228. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2366, 2370 (Rehnquist, C J., dissenting) (with whom Scalia, J., 
Kennedy, J., Thomas, J. join dissenting). 
 229. Id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy states: 
The Court, in a review that is nothing short of perfunctory, accepts the University of 
Michigan Law School’s assurances that its admissions process meets with constitutional 
requirements. The majority fails to confront the reality of how the Law School’s 
admissions policy is implemented. The dissenting opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
which I join in full, demonstrates beyond question why the concept of critical mass is a 
delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in 
most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas. An effort to 
achieve racial balance among the minorities the school seeks to attract is, by the Court’s 
own admission, “patently unconstitutional.” Ante, at 2339; see also Bakke, 438 U.S., at 
307, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.). It remains to point out how critical mass 
becomes inconsistent with individual consideration in some more specific aspects of the 
admissions process. 
Id. at 2371. 
 230. William Raspberry, Editorial, Affirmative Approach, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2004 at A17, 
available at 2004 WL 55829210. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Lisbeth B. Schorr, The O’Connor Project, 15 AM. PROSPECT 30, Jan, 1, 2004, available 
at 2004 WL 63582826. 
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Schorr identifies five concrete proposals that will make race 
preferences in higher education unnecessary in twenty-five years. 
According to Schorr, the O’Connor project for eliminating racial 
preferences as a method of achieving diversity requires eliminating racial 
disparities in the following five situations:235 (1) in birth outcomes; (2) in 
school readiness; (3) in the opportunities provided at the elementary, 
middle, and high school levels; (4) in the chance for teenagers to make a 
proper changeover to the responsibility of being a young man or woman; 
(5) in the abilities that families have to provide their children with a solid 
foundation in life.236 Schorr states: 
 
To bring the nation’s actions in line with our best intentions, in just the 
ways that Justice O’Connor’s decision implies, requires action on an 
agenda that is coherent, bold and difficult. But don’t let anybody tell 
you that it can’t be done or that we don’t know how to do it.237
 
Schorr is right to suggest America knows how to develop a race-neutral 
agenda to make race discrimination unnecessary.238 Schorr believes 
America could follow a model used in Great Britain in making race-
based affirmative action unnecessary for minorities to achieve a 
competitive education.239
Justice Ginsburg’s and Breyer’s comments in Grutter v. Bollinger 
entail the suggestion that rank racial discrimination in this nation impairs 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. Schorr states: 
THE LEADERSHIP AND THE FINANCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL resources for 
such an ambitious undertaking as the O’Connor Project would have to come from a broad 
partnership, including government and public officials at all levels, philanthropy, the 
professional and academic communities, and the local groups throughout the country that 
are already working to make their communities a better place to live. 
While we seek a wide base of support for committing the necessary resources, one model 
we could look to as a way to begin is the one now flourishing in Great Britain. When 
Prime Minister Tony Blair took office, the long-standing gap between the least and most 
advantaged populations was continuing to increase. He committed his government to 
eliminating poverty among children, to radically reducing income-based health 
disparities, and to narrowing the gap between deprived neighborhoods and the rest of the 
country all within 20 years. Funding from both government and philanthropy has 
mobilized an extraordinary array of Britain’s most daring and able individuals into the 
service of achieving these objectives. In the United States today, the challenge to 
embrace similarly lofty aspirations may seem particularly daunting, and even unrealistic. 
At a time of philanthropic retrenchment and fierce cuts in federal, state and local human-
service budgets, how can the American public be expected to support an agenda as bold 
as the O’Connor Project contemplates? 
Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. Id. 
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the ability of America to adequately prepare African-American children 
in the pipeline with a competitive white middle class education for 
purposes of college admission.240 Rank racism is still alive and well in 
America and one cannot cure that racism by invoking offensive and 
divisive race-based preferences in the college admission process.241 
Rather than engage in a temporary race-based admission formula as 
articulated by the Court in Grutter, the Court should have challenged the 
nation to adopt a comprehensive plan similar to the one outlined by 
Schorr.242 I shall “firmly forecast”243 that unless this nation commits the 
appropriate financial resources to neutralize the continuing effects of 
racial discrimination, Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer only 
hope in vain that over the next generation race-based affirmative action 
will not be necessary.244
Unless a comprehensive plan that addresses the social and economic 
gaps that exist between whites and other historically disadvantaged racial 
minorities in those five situations identified by Schorr,245 Justice 
Thomas’s conclusion that the majority’s twenty-five-year time 
limitations for race-based preferences will prove to have been based on 
mere speculation rather than objective evidence will become a self-
evident prophecy.246 In the absence of funding to implement a 
comprehensive plan addressing Schorr’s racial disparity gaps, one may 
conclude that Justice Thomas has reasonably predicted that “the gaps in 
credentials between black and white students”247 will not disappear in 
twenty-five years.248
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
I object to racially discriminatory governmental action because 
neither the local, state, nor national government has the ability to 
discriminate against an individual or any group fairly based on race. 
Race-based discrimination should not serve as a predominant factor in 
 240. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347-48 (2003) (Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., 
concurring). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Schorr, supra note 234. 
 243. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2348 (Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Schorr, supra note 234. 
 246. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2363-64 (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J., joins as to Parts I-VII, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 247. Id. at 2364. 
 248. Id. “No one can seriously contend, and the Court does not, that the racial gap in academic 
credentials will disappear in 25 years. Nor is the Court’s holding that racial discrimination will be 
unconstitutional in 25 years made contingent on the gap closing in that time.” Id. 
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the American political and legal psyche.249 Professors Joseph Tussman 
and Jacbous tenBroek correctly recommended in 1949 that all courts 
including the Supreme Court deal with race as one of those “traits which 
can never be made the basis of a constitutional classification.”250 As we 
keep our eyes on the racially-tainted diversity prize in law school 
admissions, Americans must never forget that in America, when the law 
classifies on the basis of race, we all lose. All Americans are defeated by 
race-based classifications because the predominant rationale for their use 
in America has been to either promote the natural superiority of whites or 
to promote the inborn inferiority of America’s former black slaves. 
Brown University has made a decision to examine its historical 
relationship with America’s slave trade.251 One commentator declares 
that America has a legacy of an anti-Black reaction.252 If the legacy of 
Grutter v. Bollinger proves to be that race-based diversity was deemed 
necessary by elite colleges because African-Americans are deemed to be 
inherently intellectually inferior to whites, the Grutter decision simply 
renews the debate about whether America continues to be an anti-Black 
society.253 America’s debate about using the race of African-Americans 
in making decisions about college admissions only highlights the need 
for America to search for an appropriate and equitable means to move 
 249. L. Darnell Weeden, Affirmative Action California Style─Proposition 209: The Right 
Message While Avoiding A Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because Of Race And Sex, 21 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 281, 286 (1997). 
Given America’s history with race-based classification schemes, it is not reasonable to 
believe that America can justify a race-based benefit or burden that does not violate the 
natural equality of all human beings. There was a natural law of equality before the 
legislature began to place artificial labels on groups of people to further governmental 
notions of racial superiority and official racial suppression of that class of people deemed 
to be of an inferior race. 
Id. 
 250. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 111, at 354. 
 251. Pam Belluck, Brown University to Examine Debt to Slave Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/13/education/13BROW.html?th. Belluck 
reports: 
When Ruth J. Simmons became the president of Brown University nearly three years 
ago, one striking fact could not be overlooked. 
  A great-granddaughter of slaves, Dr. Simmons was the first African-American 
president of an Ivy League university. But the 240-year-old university she was chosen to 
lead had early links to slavery, with major benefactors and officers of it having owned 
and traded slaves. 
  . . . . 
  Now, Dr. Simmons, whose office is in a building constructed by laborers who 
included slaves, has directed Brown to start what its officials say is an unprecedented 
undertaking for a university: an exploration of reparations for slavery and specifically 
whether Brown should pay reparations or otherwise make amends for its past. 
Id. 
 252. Wallace, supra note 15, at 697. 
 253. See Wallace, supra note 15, at 697. 
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beyond its history of legalized racial slavery and de jure racial 
discrimination.254 Brown University’s brave decision to revisit the issue 
of race-based slavery will hopefully help America close the economic 
disparities between some of the descendents of its former slaves based on 
a social justice program free of racial discrimination.255
A number of the descendents of America’s former slaves need 
economic justice not because of their race, but because of their inferior 
economic status. Several of the descendents of former slaves need 
economic justice because, but for the forced slavery of their ancestors, it 
is fair to presume that they would have achieved an economic status 
similar to the average white middle class person. On the other hand, one 
may presume that African-Americans who have economic status and 
education experiences similar to the average white middle class person 
may not be entitled to an individual economic justice remedy because it 
is fair to assume that the continuing effects of slavery are not the 
proximate cause of his or her failure to be competitive in the educational 
arena. Affirmative action or diversity in education for African-
Americans, or any other American, should be premised on the concept of 
economic justice, free of race discrimination after taking into account 
that person’s current individual status, as well as any historical economic 
disadvantage associated with one’s group status that is similar to slavery 
or involuntarily servitude.256
 254. See Belluck, supra note 251. Belluck reports Dr. Simmons of Brown University stated: 
“How does one repair a kind of social breach in human rights so that people are not just 
coming back to it periodically and demanding apologies,” she said, “so that society learns 
from it, acknowledges what has taken place and then moves on. What I’m trying to do, 
you see, in a country that wants to move on, I’m trying to understand as a descendant of 
slaves how to feel good about moving on.” 
Belluck, supra note 251. 
 255. Belluck, supra note 251. 
 256. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall 
exist within the United States.” 
